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Abstract
The Axelrod library is an open source Python package that allows for reproducible
game theoretic research into the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. This area of research
began in the 1980s but suffers from a lack of documentation and test code. The goal
of the library is to provide such a resource, with facilities for the design of new strate-
gies and interactions between them, as well as conducting tournaments and ecological
simulations for populations of strategies.
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With a growing collection of 136 strategies, the library is a also a platform for an
original tournament that, in itself, is of interest to the game theoretic community.
This paper describes the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Axelrod library and its
development, and insights gained from some novel research.
Keywords
Game Theory; Prisoners Dilemma; Python
Introduction
Several Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma tournaments have generated much interest; Ax-
elrod’s original tournaments [2, 3], two 2004 anniversary tournaments [20], and the
Stewart and Plotkin 2012 tournament [44], following the discovery of zero-determinant
strategies. Subsequent research has spawned a number of papers (many of which are
referenced throughout this paper), but rarely are the results reproducible. Amongst
well-known tournaments, in only one case is the full original source code available
(Axelrod’s second tournament [3], in FORTRAN). In no cases is the available code
well-documented, easily modifiable, or released with significant test suites.
To complicate matters further, a new strategy is often studied in isolation with oppo-
nents chosen by the creator of that strategy. Often such strategies are not sufficiently
described to enable reliable recreation (in the absence of source code), with [42] being a
notable counter-example. In some cases, strategies are revised without updates to their
names or published implementations [25, 26]. As such, the results cannot be reliably
replicated and therefore have not met the basic scientific criterion of falsifiability.
This paper introduces a software package: the Axelrod-Python library. The Axelrod-
Python project has the following stated goals:
• To enable the reproduction of Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma research as easily as
possible
• To produce the de-facto tool for any future Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma research
• To provide as simple a means as possible for anyone to define and contribute new
and original Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma strategies
The presented library is partly motivated by an ongoing discussion in the academic
community about reproducible research [9, 16, 39, 40], and is:
• Open: all code is released under an MIT license;
• Reproducible and well-tested: at the time of writing there is an excellent level of
integrated tests with 99.73% coverage (including property based tests: [28])
• Well-documented: all features of the library are documented for ease of use and
modification
• Extensive: 135 strategies are included, with infinitely-many available in the case
of parametrised strategies
• Extensible: easy to modify to include new strategies and to run new tournaments
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Review of the literature
As stated in [6]: “few works in social science have had the general impact of [Axelrod’s
study of the evolution of cooperation]”. In 1980, Axelrod wrote two papers: [2, 3] which
describe a computer tournament that has been a major influence on subsequent game
theoretic work [5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 18, 23, 24, 27, 34, 35, 36, 38, 43, 44]. As
described in [6] this work has not only had impact in mathematics but has also led
to insights in biology (for example in [43], a real tournament where Blue Jays are the
participants is described) and in particular in the study of evolution.
The tournament is based on an iterated game (see [29] or similar for details) where two
players repeatedly play the normal form game of (1) in full knowledge of each other’s
playing history to date. An excellent description of the one shot game is given in [13]
which is paraphrased below:
Two players must choose between Cooperate (C) and Defect (D):
• If both choose C, they receive a payoff of R (Reward);
• If both choose D, they receive a payoff of P (Punishment);
• If one chooses C and the other D, the defector receives a payoff of T (Temptation)
and the cooperator a payoff of S (Sucker).
and the following reward matrix results from the Cartesian product of two decision
vectors 〈C,D〉,(
R,R S, T
T, S P, P
)
such that T > R > P > S and 2R > T + S (1)
The game of (1) is called the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Specific numerical values of (R, S, T, P ) =
(3, 0, 5, 1) are often used in the literature [2, 3], although any satisfying the conditions
in 1 will yield similar results. Axelrod’s tournaments (and further implementations of
these) are sometimes referred to as Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) tournaments.
An incomplete representative overview of published tournaments is given in Table 1.
Year Reference Number of Strategies Type Source Code
1979 [2] 13 Standard Not immediately available
1979 [3] 64 Standard Available in FORTRAN
1991 [6] 13 Noisy Not immediately available
2002 [43] 16 Wildlife Not a computer based tournament
2005 [20] 223 Varied Not available
2012 [44] 13 Standard Not fully available
Table 1: An overview of a selection of published tournaments. Not all tournaments
were ‘standard’ round robins; for more details see the indicated references.
In [34] a description is given of how incomplete information can be used to enhance
cooperation, in a similar approach to the proof of the Folk theorem for repeated games
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[29]. This aspect of incomplete information is also considered in [6, 24, 35] where “noisy”
tournaments randomly flip the choice made by a given strategy. In [36], incomplete
information is considered in the sense of a probabilistic termination of each round of
the tournament.
As mentioned before, IPD tournaments have been studied in an evolutionary context:
[12, 24, 38, 44] consider this in a traditional evolutionary game theory context. These
works investigate particular evolutionary contexts within which cooperation can evolve
and persist. This can be in the context of direct interactions between strategies or
population dynamics for populations of many players using a variety of strategies,
which can lead to very different results. For example, in [24] a machine learning
algorithm in a population context outperforms strategies described in [38] and [44]
that are claimed to dominate any evolutionary opponent in head-to-head interactions.
Further to these evolutionary ideas, [8, 10] are examples of using machine learning
techniques to evolve particular strategies. In [4], Axelrod describes how similar tech-
niques are used to genetically evolve a high performing strategy from a given set of
strategies. Note that in his original work, Axelrod only used a base strategy set of 12
strategies for this evolutionary study. This is noteworthy as the library now boasts
over 136 strategies that are readily available for a similar analysis.
Implementation and architecture
Description of the Axelrod Python package
The library is written in Python (http://www.python.org/) which is a popular lan-
guage in the academic community with libraries developed for a variety of uses includ-
ing:
• Algorithmic Game Theory [30] (http://gambit.sourceforge.net/)).
• Astrophysics [1] (http://www.astropy.org/);
• Data manipulation [33] (http://pandas.pydata.org/);
• Machine learning [37] (http://scikit-learn.org/);
• Mathematics [46] (http://www.sagemath.org/);
• Visualisation [17] (http://matplotlib.org/);
Furthermore, in [18] Python is described as an appropriate language for the reproduc-
tion of Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma tournaments due to its object oriented nature and
readability.
The library itself is available at https://github.com/Axelrod-Python/Axelrod. This
is a hosted git repository. Git is a version control system which is one of the recom-
mended aspects of reproducible research [9, 40].
As stated in the Introduction, one of the main goals of the library is to allow for the
easy contribution of strategies. Doing this requires the writing of a simple Python class
(which can inherit from other predefined classes). All components of the library are
automatically tested using a combination of unit, property and integration tests. These
tests are run as new features are added to the library to ensure compatibility (they are
also run automatically using travis-ci.org). When submitting a strategy, a simple
test is required which ensures the strategy behaves as expected. Full contribution
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guidelines can be found in the documentation, which is also part of the library itself
and is hosted using readthedocs.org. As an example, Figures 1 and 2 show the source
code for the Grudger strategy as well as its corresponding test.
class Grudger(Player):
"""A player starts by cooperating however will defect if
at any point the opponent has defected."""
name = ’Grudger’
classifier = {
’memory_depth’: float(’inf’), # Long memory
’stochastic’: False,
’inspects_source’: False,
’manipulates_source’: False,
’manipulates_state’: False
}
def strategy(self, opponent):
"""Begins by playing C, then plays D for the remaining
rounds if the opponent ever plays D."""
if opponent.defections:
return D
return C
Figure 1: Source code for the Grudger strategy.
You can see an overview of the structure of the source code in Figure 3. This shows the
parallel collection of strategies and their tests. Furthermore the underlying engine for
the library is a class for tournaments which lives in the tournament.py module. This
class is responsible for coordinating the play of generated matches (from the match.py
module). This generation of matches is the responsibility of a match generator class
(in the match generator.py module) which is designed in such a way as to be easily
modifiable to create new types of tournaments. This is described further in a tutorial
in the documentation which shows how to easily create a tournament where players
only play each other with probability 0.5. This will be discussed further in the reuse
section of this paper.
To date the library has had contributions from 26 contributors from a variety of back-
grounds which are not solely academic. These contributions have been mostly in terms
of strategies. One strategy is the creation of an undergraduate mathematics student
with little prior knowledge of programming. Multiple other strategies were written by
a 15 year old secondary school student. Both of these students are authors of this
paper. As well as these strategy contributions, vital architectural improvements to the
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class TestGrudger(TestPlayer):
name = "Grudger"
player = axelrod.Grudger
expected_classifier = {
’memory_depth’: float(’inf’), # Long memory
’stochastic’: False,
’inspects_source’: False,
’manipulates_source’: False,
’manipulates_state’: False
}
def test_initial_strategy(self):
"""
Starts by cooperating
"""
self.first_play_test(C)
def test_strategy(self):
"""
If opponent defects at any point then the player will defect forever
"""
self.responses_test([C, D, D, D], [C, C, C, C], [C])
self.responses_test([C, C, D, D, D], [C, D, C, C, C], [D])
Figure 2: Test code for the Grudger strategy.
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tournament.py player.py strategies/
Cooperator.py Defector.py
TitForTat.py
......
tests/unit/
TestCoop... TestDef...
TestTitFor...
...
travis.ci
doc/
readthedocs.org
match.py
match_generatory.py
Figure 3: An overview of the source code.
library itself have also been contributed.
(2) Availability
Operating system
The Axelrod library runs on all major operating systems: Linux, Mac OS X and
Windows.
Programming language
The library is continuously tested for compatibility with Python 2.7 and the two most
recent python 3 releases.
Additional system requirements
There are no specific additional system requirements.
Support
Support is readily available in multiple forms:
• An online chat channel: https://gitter.im/Axelrod-Python/Axelrod.
• An email group: https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/axelrod-python.
Dependencies
The following Python libraries are required dependencies:
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• Numpy 1.9.2
• Matplotlib 1.4.2 (only a requirement
if graphical output is required)
• Tqdm 3.4.0
• Hypothesis 3.0 (only a requirement
for development)
List of contributors
The names of all the contributors are not known: as these were mainly done through
Github and some have not provided their name or responded to a request for further
details. Here is an incomplete list:
• Owen Campbell
• Marc Harper
• Vincent Knight
• Karol M. Langner
• James Campbell
• Thomas Campbell
• Alex Carney
• Martin Chorley
• Cameron Davidson-Pilon
• Kristian Glass
• Nikoleta Glynatsi
• Toma´sˇ Ehrlich
• Martin Jones
• Georgios Koutsovoulos
• Holly Tibble
• Jochen Mu¨ller
• Geraint Palmer
• Paul Slavin
• Timothy Standen
• Luis Visintini
• Karl Molden
• Jason Young
• Andy Boot
• Anna Barriscale
Software location:
Archive
Name: Zenodo
Persistent identifier: 10.5281/zenodo.55509
Licence: MIT
Publisher: Vincent Knight
Version published: Axelrod: 1.2.0
Date published: 2016-06-13
Code repository
Name: Github
Identifier: https://github.com/Axelrod-Python/Axelrod
Licence: MIT
Date published: 2015-02-16
Reuse potential
The Axelrod library has been designed with sustainable software practices in mind.
There is an extensive documentation suite: axelrod.readthedocs.org/en/latest/.
Furthermore, there is a growing set of example Jupyter notebooks available here:
https://github.com/Axelrod-Python/Axelrod-notebooks.
The availability of a large number of strategies makes this tool an excellent and obvious
example of the benefits of open research which should positively impact the game theory
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community. This is evidently true already as the library has been used to study and
create interesting and powerful new strategies.
Installation of the library is straightforward via standard python installation repos-
itories (https://pypi.python.org/pypi). The package name is axelrod and can
thus be installed by calling: pip install axelrod on all major operating systems
(Windows, OS X and Linux).
Figure 4 shows a very simple example of using the library to create a basic tournament
giving the graphical output shown in Figure 5.
>>> import axelrod
>>> strategies = [s() for s in axelrod.demo_strategies]
>>> tournament = axelrod.Tournament(strategies)
>>> results = tournament.play()
>>> plot = axelrod.Plot(results)
>>> p = plot.boxplot()
>>> p.show()
Figure 4: A simple set of commands to create a demonstration tournament. The output
is shown in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: The results from a simple tournament.
New strategies, tournaments and implications
Due to the open nature of the library the number of strategies included has grown at
a fast pace, as can be seen in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: The number of strategies included in the library
Nevertheless, due to previous research being done in an irreproducible manner with,
for example, no source code and/or vaguely described strategies, not all previous tour-
naments can yet be reproduced. In fact, some of the early tournaments might be
impossible to reproduce as the source code is apparently forever lost. This library aims
ensure reproducibility in the future.
One tournament that is possible to reproduce is that of [44]. The strategies used in
that tournament are the following:
1. Cooperator
2. Defector
3. ZD-Extort-2
4. Joss: 0.9
5. Hard Tit For Tat
6. Hard Tit For 2 Tats
7. Tit For Tat
8. Grudger
9. Tit For 2 Tats
10. Win-Stay Lose-Shift
11. Random: 0.5
12. ZD-GTFT-2
13. GTFT: 0.33
14. Hard Prober
15. Prober
16. Prober 2
17. Prober 3
18. Calculator
19. Hard Go By Majority
This can be reproduced as shown in Figure 8, which gives the plot of Figure 7. Note
that slight differences with the results of [44] are due to stochastic behaviour of some
strategies.
In parallel to the Python library, a tournament is being kept up to date that pits
all available strategies against each other. Figure 9 shows the results from the full
tournament which can also be seen (in full detail) here: http://axelrod-tournament.
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Figure 7: The results from [44].
readthedocs.org/. Data sets are also available showing the plays of every match that
takes place. Note that to recreate this tournament simply requires changing a single
line of the code shown in Figure 4, changing:
>>> strategies = [s() for s in axelrod.demo_strategies]}
to:
>>> strategies = [s() for s in axelrod.ordinary_strategies]}.
The current winning strategy is new to the research literature: Looker Up. This is a
strategy that maps a given set of states to actions. The state space is defined generically
by m,n so as to map states to actions as shown in (2).
((C,D,D,D,C,D,D,C)︸ ︷︷ ︸
m first actions by opponent
,
n last pairs of actions︷ ︸︸ ︷
((C,C), (C,C)))→ D (2)
The example of (2) is an incomplete illustration of the mapping for m = 8, n = 2. Intu-
itively, this state space uses the initial plays of the opponent to gain some information
about its intentions whilst still taking into account the recent play. The actual winning
strategy is an instance of the framework for m = n = 2 for which a particle swarm
algorithm has been used to train it. The second placed strategy was trained with an
evolutionary algorithm [19, 22]. In [21] experiments are described that evaluate how
the second placed strategy behaves in environments other than those in which it was
trained and it continues to perform strongly.
There are various other insights that have been gained from ongoing open research on
the library, details can be found in [14]. These include:
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>>> import axelrod
>>> strategies = [axelrod.Cooperator(),
... axelrod.Defector(),
... axelrod.ZDExtort2(),
... axelrod.Joss(),
... axelrod.HardTitForTat(),
... axelrod.HardTitFor2Tats(),
... axelrod.TitForTat(),
... axelrod.Grudger(),
... axelrod.TitFor2Tats(),
... axelrod.WinStayLoseShift(),
... axelrod.Random(),
... axelrod.ZDGTFT2(),
... axelrod.GTFT(),
... axelrod.HardProber(),
... axelrod.Prober(),
... axelrod.Prober2(),
... axelrod.Prober3(),
... axelrod.Calculator(),
... axelrod.HardGoByMajority()]
>>> tournament = axelrod.Tournament(strategies)
>>> results = tournament.play()
>>> plot = axelrod.Plot(results)
>>> p = plot.boxplot()
>>> p.show()
Figure 8: Source code for reproducing the tournament of [44]
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Figure 9: Results from the library tournament (2016-06-13)
• A closer look at zero determinant strategies, showing that extortionate strategies
obtain a large number of wins: the number of times they outscore an opponent
during a given match. However these do not perform particularly well from the
overall tournament ranking point of view. This is relevant given the findings of
[44] in which zero determinant strategies are shown to be able to perform better
than any other strategy. This finding extends to noisy tournaments (which are
also implemented in the library).
• This negative relationship between wins and performance does not generalise.
There are some strategies that perform well, both in terms of matches won and
overall performance: Back stabber, Double crosser, Looker Up, and Fool Me
Once. These strategies continue to perform well in noisy tournaments, how-
ever some of these have knowledge of the length of the game (Back stabber and
Double crosser). This is not necessary to rank well in both wins and score as
demonstrated by Looker Up and Fool Me Once.
• Strategies like Looker Up and Meta Hunter seem to be generally cooperative yet
still exploit naive strategies. The Meta Hunter strategy is a particular type of
Meta strategy which uses a variety of other strategy behaviours to choose a best
action. These strategies perform very well in general and continue to do so in
noisy tournaments.
Conclusion
This paper has presented a game theoretic software package that aims to address
reproducibility of research into the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. The open nature of
the development of the library has lead rapidly to the inclusion of many well known
strategies, many novel strategies, and new and recapitulated insights.
The capabilities of the library mentioned above are not at all comprehensive, a list of
the current abilities include:
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• Noisy tournaments.
• Tournaments with probabilistic ending of interactions.
• Ecological analysis of tournaments.
• Moran processes.
• Morality metrics based on [41].
• Transformation of strategies (in effect giving an infinite number of strategies).
• Classification of strategies according to multiple dimensions.
• Gathering of full interaction history for all interactions.
• Parallelization of computations for tournaments with a high computational cost.
These capabilities are constantly being updated.
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